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FELONY MURDER AS A FIRST DEGREE OFFENSE: AN
ANACHRONISM RETAINED
TiiE felony murder doctrine occupies an anomalous and much criticized
position in the American law of homicide. Where murder is divided into two
degrees of culpability, felony murder is considered a first degree offense.1 Yet
unlike other offenses of the same degree, felony murder does not depend on the
relation between the killing and the offender's mental state; the homicide need
only occur in the commission of a prescribed felony.2 All other murders carry-
ing equal punishment require that the homicide be willful, premeditated and
deliberate. 3 This requirement accords with a basic principle that punishment
of homicide be proportionate to culpability measured by mental state.
1. This is true of thirty-six American jurisdictions recognizing two degrees of murder.
See the statutory compilation in MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS AD-
MINISTRATION 1271-72 n.6(A), (C) (1940).
Two jurisdictions recognize three degrees of murder. One of these, Florida, imposes
first degree punishment on felony killings arising out of arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
abominable and detestable crime against nature or kidnapping, third degree for those
iccurring in the commission of any other felony. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (Supp.
1955). The other, Minnesota, does not treat felony killings as first degree murder but
provides second degree punishment for those arising out of rape, assault with an intent to
commit rape, indecent assault or sodomy and third degree for those occurring in the course
of any other felony. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 619.07, .08, .10 (Supp. 1955).
Ten jurisdictions do not recognize degrees of murder. In five, felony killings are ex-
pressly punishable as murder by statute. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 26, §§ 26-1002, 1009 (Supp.
1955) (murder when underlying crime is punishable by death or confinement in peniten-
tiary and when killing committed in "prosecution of riotous intent"); LA. Ray. STAT.
ANN. § 14:30 (Supp. 1955) (aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnap-
ping, a.ggravated rape, robbery); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2215 (Supp. 1954) (arson, rape,
robbery, burglary) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (Supp. 1955) (commission of any
felony); S.D. CODE § 13.2007 (Supp. 1952) (commission of any felony). There is no
statutory prescription of felony killings in the other five no-degree jurisdictions. IL.. ANN.
STAT. c. 38, § 358 (Smith-Hurd 1955) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 435.010 (Baldwin 1955) ;
M. RE;v. STAT. AN,. c. 130, § 1 (Supp. 1955); S.C. CODE § 16-51 (Supp. 1955); 2
TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1256 (Supp. 1956). However, case law in these jurisdictions
indicates that felony killings are subject to murder convictions. See, e.g., People v. Pierce,
387 Ill. 608, 57 N.E.2d 345 (1944) ; Simpson v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W.2d
969 (1943) ; State v. Merry, 136 Me. 243, 248, 8 A.2d 143, 146 (1939) ; State v. Judge,
208 S.C. 497, 505-06, 38 S.E.2d 715, 719 (1946); Miers v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 572,
251 S.W.2d 404 (1952). See text at notes 23-24 infra.
2. Most statutes list arson, rape, robbery and burglary as the prescribed felonies.
MICHAEL & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1271 n.6(A). See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN.
tit. 14, § 314 (Supp. 1955) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (Supp. 1955).
3. Although formulations of the premeditation and deliberation requirement differ,
the majority of jurisdictions uses these words. MICHAEL & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note
1, at 1270-71 n.5. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.2 (Supp. 1956) ; MONT. RE1. CODES
AnN. § 94-2503 (Supp. 1955).
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Recent criticism has primarily focused on extensions of the felony murder
doctrine.4 The history of the law of homicide indicates, however, that felony
murder itself is incompatible with the concept of culpability.5 This inconsist-
ency has been the major obstacle to commentators who have criticized exten-
sions of the doctrine, for they have sought to read a requirement of mental
state into a rule which does not demand a showing of intent to kill., A solution
to the problems which both felony murder and its extensions raise may more
likely be found in an analysis which tests the validity of the doctrine itself.
Although a concept of culpability was not an element of homicide in early
common law, its importance was recognized by the end of the thirteenth cen-
tury. Originally all killings were homicides regardless of attendant circum-
stances, and all homicides were capital offenses. 7 In 1278, however, a statute
made pardon available to the offender who killed in self-defense or by "mis-
adventure." Later, some homicides committed under color of law became justi-
fiable.9 Although the defendant who escaped capital punishment by proving
self-defense or misadventure nevertheless suffered conviction, forfeiture and
the expense of obtaining a pardon, one who killed under color of law was
simply not guilty of homicide.' Thus culpability, introduced as a basis for
post-conviction mitigation of punishment, became a substantive ground for
absolving guilt.
Further development of culpability as the criterion of punishment for homi-
cide was impeded by the practice of "benefit of clergy" which allowed the
literate defendant to escape capital punishment even if his killing was neither
justifiable nor pardonable. Attaching to all capital offenses," the benefit was
4. See, e.g., Notes, 59 DIcK. L. REX'. 183 (1955) ; 31 IND L J 534- (1956) ; 54 Mxca.
L. REv. 860 (1956). First degree murder conviction has beet held proper where the victim
of a robbery killed defendant's escapitng accomplice while chasing him in a direction dif-
ferent from that taken by defendant, Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204
(1955) ; and where the death of defendant's accomplice was caused by his own neglect in
setting fire to an empty house, Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955).
5. See text at note 33 infra. See also Norris, The Felon's Responsibility for the
Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 50 (1956).
6. See, e.g., Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony Murder Rule, 1952 WAsHl. U.L.Q.
191, 208-10; Note, 31 IND. L.J. 534, 536 (1956).
7. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 473 (2d ed. 1905) (here-
inafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND) and 2 HoLswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
358-59 (4th ed. 1936) (hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTrH), noting that the executioner
carrying out a lawful sentence was excepted from this extreme liability.
8. Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 EDW. 1, c. 9. Pardon was previously available in
such cases; this statute, however, formalized the procedure for obtaining it. See 2 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND 480-81. The royal pardon thus authorized remained discretionary although
it later could be obtained as a matter of course. See ibid.; 2 HoLDswoRTHx 359.
9. In 1293, a statute made not punishable and hence justifiable the killing of a tres-
passer resisting expulsion by foresters, parkers and warreners. 21 EDW. 1, No. 2 (1293).
10. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 479-81; 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW Or
ENGLAND 40-41 (1883) (hereinafter cited as STEPHEN).
11. The benefit attached to all felonies. GABEL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN
THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 116 (1929) (hereinafter cited as GABEL). In England, all felonies
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designed to insure Church trial of clerics by transferring their prosecution from
Crown jurisdiction.12 Since literacy was unknown among lay persons, a read-
ing test was one method of determining whether an offender was entitled to
invoke the benefit. 13 By the end of the fourteenth century, satisfying this test
became in itself sufficient proof of clericity.14 But since the ability to read was
no longer confined to clerics, any literate offender, lay or cleric, could escape
Crown jurisdiction.1 Submission to Church jurisdiction gave absolute im-
munity from capital punishment. 16 And likelihood of acquittal was increased
because ecclesiastical courts were more lenient than lay tribunals.17 In allow-
ing a preferred citizenry whose punishment was dictated by the unrelated
factor of literacy, the benefit of clergy disregarded the circumstances of the
killing and thus prevented uniform application of culpability as the sole meas-
ure of punishment.
Culpability gained full effect in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when
homicide was divided into two offenses and the benefit of clergy removed from
the one characterized by criminal mental state. A series of statutes finally
removed the benefit entirely from the more culpable homicides, denominated
murders.' 8 Homicides other than murders retained the benefit. The two were
distinguished on the basis of the offender's mental state. If one killed with
malice aforethought, the required mental state, he was guilty of murder; the
same act without malice aforethought was only criminal homicide.19
ex-cept petty larceny were capital crimes through the eighteenth century. 3 STEPHEN 75.
But ef. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMSERICA 29 (1955) (hereinafter cited as DAL-
ZELL), indicating that the benefit may not have attached to high treason, some forms of
arson, lying in wait on the highway, and ravaging the countryside, but not revealing dates
under discussion.
12. DALzELL 11; GABEL 7.
13. GABEL 30.
14. DALZELL 16; GA1EL 68-70.
15. GABEL 70. During the fifteenth century, the reading test made the benefit of clergy
available to a considerable number of laymen. Id. at 118.
16. DALZELL 10; GABEL 117.
17. DALZELL 11; GABEL 117-18.
18. 12 HEN. 7, c. 7 (1496) ; 4 HEN. 8, c. 2 (1512) ; 23 HEN. 8, c. 1, s. 3 (1531) ; 1
Erw. 6, c. 12, s. 10 (1547).
19. Murder, or murdrum, had appeared in the law prior to these statutes. Originally
meaning a secret homicide, inurdrum was probably later thought by the popular mind to
indicate the worst kind of killing. 2 POLLOCK & MAITAxnD 485-88. Although Stephen
speculates that a statute of 1389 may have defined murder indirectly by disallowing pardon
fior killings committed with malice aforethought, see note 22 infra, he agrees that murder
as distinguished from all other criminal homicides achieved importance only through the
series of statutes removing the benefit of clergy. 3 STEPHEN 43-44. "Malice" did not appear
in the first of these four statutes, which by refusing the benefit to those who "prepensedly
murder[edl" their superiors, aimed at petty treason. 12 HEN. 7, c. 7 (1496) ; see STEPHEN
44. Although Stephen finds the second statute referring to "murder upon malice pre-
pensed" and a modern critic repeats this finding, Perkins, A Re-examination of falice
Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 543 n.61 (1934), these words are absent from the statute.
Instead this statute removed the benefit from cases of murder committed "in any Church,
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The meaning of malice aforethought, however, was vague. The term was
first used in a statute to describe homicides not subject to pardon 2 before
appearing as the definition of murder in the statutes removing the benefit of
clergy. 21 In both, it appears to have meant nothing more definite than a general
intention to commit a wrong.2 2 Although no reported judicial authority in this
period seems to ascribe more specific content to malice aforethought, it clearly
included felony killings which were later explained by the constructive malice
doctrine, the forerunner of felony murder.23 Constructive malice imputed to
Highway, etc." 4 HEN. 8, c. 2 (1512). The third statute removed the benefit from "wilful
murder of malice prepensed" but excluded clerics of the order of sub-deacon or above from
its scope. 23 Hax. 8, c. 1, s. 3 (1531). The fourth statute eliminated this exception and
removed the benefit of clergy from all murders "of malice prepensed," thus finally estab-
lishing the fundamental distinction between that offense and other criminal homicides. 1
EDw. 6, c. 12, s. 10 (1547).
20. 13 RIcH. 2, No. 2, c. 1 (1389). See note 22 infra.
21. See statutes cited at note 18 supra.
22. The term "malice aforethought" first appeared in the law of homicide during the
thirteenth century. Pardon was then granted for homicides found to have been committed
in self-defense or by misadventure and not with "malice prepense." See 2 POLLOCX &
MAITLAND 480-81. Agreed that malice aforethought meant little more than intentional
wrongdoing in this period, Pollock and Maitland believed the term dated from the days
when waylaying and ambush were common occurrences. Id. at 469. Relying on these com-
mentators, one writer has concluded that malice aforethought originally meant intentional
wrongdoing and subsequently referred to ambush and waylaying rather than initially de-
riving from those situations. Perkins, supra note 19, at 545. But the first statute to use
malice aforethought also withheld pardon from killings by "await" and "assault"-un-
necessary additions if the term then referred to ambush or waylaying. 13 RICH. 2, No. 2,
c. 1 (1389).
About 150 years later the last statute in the series removing the benefit of clergy from
murder was passed. See note 19 supra. Although Stephen disagrees, malice aforethought,
as used in these statutes, meant a "wicked . . . spirit." FosTm, CROwN LAw 256-57
(1762). Stephen's contrary conclusion that the term was used in its "popular sense" of
some type of premeditated hate is based on the Statute of Stabbing. Passed in 1604, that
statute removed the benefit of clergy from homicides committed by stabbing under pro-
vocation less than that of a drawn weapon. Statute of Stabbing, 1604, 2 JAc. 1, c. 8.
Properly inferring that killings upon slight provocation were not murders, Stephen then
illogically ascribes premeditation to malice aforethought. See 3 STEPHEN 47-48. The
factual inconsistency between premeditation and provocation does not establish that the
former defined malice aforethought. Instead, in recognizing provocation as a defense to a
murder charge the law merely admitted that a provoked killing is not attended by malice
aforethought.
23. The first felony killing case appears to have arisen eleven years prior to the en-
actment of the last statute in the series removing the benefit of clergy from murder. In
Mansell and Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer 128b, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1536), a group of men
who had unlawfully attempted to seize goods were convicted of murder when one of them
struck and killed a woman with a stone thrown at another person. One year earlier, an-
other group illegally hunting had been adjudged guilty of murder for one member's kill-
ing a gamekeeper who challenged him. Lord Dacres' Case, Moore 216, 72 Eng. Rep. 458
(K.B. 1535). Although the latter has been thought the first felony killing case, Note, 31
IxD. L.J. 534 n.3 (1956), the decision may have turned on the finding that the defendants
had explicitly agreed to kill whoever might resist. Since no such finding of intent to kill
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the homicide the malice aforethought of the underlying felony, thus substitut-
ing for direct proof of that mental state.2 4 Nevertheless, while constructive
malice rested on the malice of the felony and not of the killing, it did not
broaden the offense of murder. The vague content of malice aforethought
would probably have been satisfied by the anti-social mind of the felon without
the doctrinal rationalization provided by constructive malice.2 5 As a rule of
law derived from a sound generalization, constructive malice met the then-
existing test of culpability based on mental state.
This was the state of the English common law which governed the Ameri-
can colonies.23 Despite the numerous crimes carrying the death penalty, culp-
ability based on mental state had become an established principle determining
punishment of homicide. The murderer could in no way escape capital punish-
ment: his offense was neither justifiable nor pardonable; his literacy was
irrelevant.
After the American Revolution, the Pennsylvania legislature, in accord with
a constitutionally expressed policy of restricting capital punishment to the more
culpable offenses, 27 made a further division in the law of homicide by creating
was made in Mansell and Herbert's Case, mipra, 1536 might better be considered the focal
date. Note, 59 Dicx. L. REv. 183, 185 (1955) ; cf. Note, 31 IND. L.J. 534 n.3 (1956).
Constructive malice was long described under the heading "implied malice." Using the
latter term, Coke required only that the underlying act causing the homicide be unlawful.
Thus, he hypothesized, human death caused by an arrow shot at a wild fowl was homicide
by misadventure; were the arrow shot at a tame fowl, the offense was murder since hunt-
ing tame fowl was an illegal act. COKE, THIRD IN STITUTE 56 (1809 ed.). In 1762, Foster
required that the underlying act be a felony. FOSTER, CROWN LAW 258 (1762). In
spite of the long usage of the term "implied malice," the doctrine explaining murder con-
victions in these situations today is labelled constructive malice. See ROYAL CoMM~sIssIoN
o, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-53, REPORT 382-88 (1953); cf. Commonwealth v. Bolish,
3S1 Pa. 500, 529, 113 A.2d 464, 479 (1955) (dissenting opinion using the term "construc-
tive murder").
24. Under the rationale of constructive crime, the intent to commit the felony serves
as intent to commit the homicide growing out of the felony. See MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 88(d) (1934) ; STROUD, MENS REA 169-70 (1914). But since malice aforethought mere-
ly meant a general intention to commit a wrong, intent to commit a felony was in itself
malice. See Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 189-90, 53 A.2d 736, 741 (1947).
25. The result in Mansell and Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer 128b, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B.
1536), for example, was reached without any doctrinal rationalization.
26. During the colonial period, Pennsylvania temporarily changed the common law
definition of murder. In 1683 catch-all malice aforethought was replaced by a statute re-
quiring that the homicide be committed "wilfully or premeditately." CHARTER AND LAWS
OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA 144 (Linn 1879). Although a change of governors
resulted in "dissolution" of this statute, id. at 547, it was substantially reenacted in 1700,
id. at 210. The required mental state was further narrowed six years later by the sub-
stitution of "and" for "or." 2 STAT. AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 1700-12, at 172 (1896).
In 1718, however, the common law definition of murder was re-adopted. 3 id. 1712-24, at
199, 200-02.
27. Section 38 of Pennsylvania's first constitution provided: "The penal laws, as here-
tofore used, shall be reformed by the future Legislature of this State, as soon as may be,
and punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more proportionate
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two degrees of murder. In 1793 the Senate of that state passed resolutions
limiting capital punishment to murder in the first degree 28 and providing lesser
punishment for that of the second degree. The latter encompassed the com-
mon law definition of murder, requiring only malice aforethought. 2' First
degree murder had in addition to be willful, premeditated and deliberate.3°
Thus a mental state characterized by a design to kill fundamentally distin-
guished the differently punished degrees of murder. But the bill embodying
the Senate resolutions was amended to include felony murder as a first degree
offense and was finally passed in this form.3 ' The Pennsylvania definition of
felony murder-murder committed in the course of arson, rape, robbery or
burglary-was substantially reproduced in the criminal codes of thirty-five
other jurisdictions now recognizing two degrees of murder.
With the enactment of statutes simultaneously creating degrees of murder
and labeling felony murder a first degree offense, the principle of culpability
based on mental state has been subserved and subverted at the same time. Con-
structive malice provided proof of the required mental state for what has since
become second degree murder, malice aforethought; felony murder, on the
other hand, is punishable as first degree murder. Furthermore, unlike the
relation of constructive malice to common law murder, felony murder broadens
the scope of first degree murder by supplying proof of a mental state in law
that may not exist in fact. The mental state of first degree murder is more
specific than malice aforethought. Willfulness, premeditation and deliberation
are highly particularized requirements, constituting in combination a design to
kill directed against a selected individual.3 2 Were this characteristic of first
degree murder construed as a general state of mind like malice aforethought.
to the crimes." PA. CONST. § 38 (1776), 9 STAT. AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 1776-79,
at 585, 600 (1903). Fourteen years later, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution which
contained no comparable section. Nevertheless, the spirit of reform continued. Keedy,
History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 759,
768 (1949).
28. The Resolutions also allowed the death penalty for high treason. 3 J. OF SENATE
114 (Pa. 1793), quoted in Keedy, supra note 27, at 771. But the final draft of the bill
embodying the Resolutions made only first degree murder a capital crime. 4 J. OF SENATE
80 (Pa. 1794), quoted in Keedy, supra note 27, at 772.
29. Murder in the second degree was defined as "all other kinds of murder." 3 J. 01
SENATE 114 (Pa. 1793), quoted in Keedy, supra note 27, at 771.
30. The resolutions also denominated killings committed by poison or lying in wait
murders in the first degree. Ibid. But these are merely methods of killing in which pre-
meditation and deliberation are inherent.
31. The amendment added the phrase "or which shall be committed in the perpetration
of or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary" to the definition of first
degree murder. 4 J. OF SENATE 80 (Pa. 1794), quoted in Keedy, supra -note 27, at 772.
32. Although premeditation and deliberation may no longer retain their classic mean-
ing, intent to kill formed prior to the act of killing nevertheless remains essential. 'MORE-
LAND, LAW OF HOMIeClDE 209 (1952) (hereinafter cited as MORELAND), and sources
therein cited. Intent to kill must necessarily be directed at a given individual or individ-
uals. This does not mean that the person killed must be the intended person. When the
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the existence of degrees of murder would be meaningless. True, when the
design to kill of first degree murder can be proved on the part of the felon
killer, felony murder would operate as did constructive malice under the com-
mon law. But though a general intention to do wrong accompanies commis-
sion of a felony, not every arsonist, rapist, robber or burglar has formed a
specific design to kill. By eliminating inquiry into whether such design in fact
exists, the felony murder doctrine thus stretches first degree murder beyond
the limits of its required mental state. This indiscriminate grouping of offenses
characterized by a specific design to kill with crimes marked by the commission
of a felony undermines the principle of culpability based on mental state.
Accordingly, felony murder should be abolished. 3 3 This conclusion, moreover,
does not depend on whether the objective of the criminal law is retribution
and the righting of wrongs, deterrence and the prevention of future criminal-
ity, or reformation and the offender's rehabilitated return to society. Basic to
that law is the principal that punishment, whatever its theoretical justification,
should be proportionate to culpability.
Abolition of the felony murder doctrine need not make irrelevant evidence
that the homicide occurred in the course of a felony. Such proof would still
establish catch-all malice aforethought and hence justify conviction for second
degree murder."3 4 Should first degree conviction be sought, however, the prose-
cution would have to meet the requirement that premeditation and deliberation
occur prior to the killing3 5 Where the killing during a felony is an instinctive
response to the act of the victim, conviction for first degree murder may not
be possible unless premeditation and deliberation are found at some point prior
to the fatal movement. Nevertheless, present notions of premeditation and
deliberation could be met in certain felony killings without the doctrine. The
felon who sets fire to an inhabited building knowing that the occupants cannot
escape may be considered to have premeditated and deliberated their death.
The robber and the burglar, on the other hand, are less likely to contemplate
the death of those at the scene of their crimes.
The premeditation and deliberation requirements could conceivably be
manipulated, however, to bring the acts of each of these felons within first
degree murder. Thus the robber and the burglar could be deemed to have
designed to kill those who obstructed commission of their felonies even though
actual victim is not the intended victim, a murder conviction may be secured under the
doctrine of transferred intent. See MORELAND 19-20; 2 BLACKSToNE, COmmENTARI
"200-01.
33. Although not within the scope of this Note, statutes prescribing first degree
murder punishment as a matter of course for certain dangerous acts would be subject to
similar criticism. See, e.g., 3 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8351 (1949) (providing first degree
punishment when death caused by tampering with railroad).
34. See text at note 29 supra; cf. Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 189-90, 53
A.2d 736, 741 (1947).
35. Although premeditation and deliberation may occur just short of simultaneously
with the Idlling, they must still precede the act. MORELAND 209.
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-unlike setting fire to an inhabited building-these felonies could be con-
summated without loss of life. But manipulation of so elusive a concept as
mental state is difficult to control and in practice may lead to confusion of
premeditation and deliberation with causation alone. The arsonist, for ex-
ample, could be convicted of first degree murder whether or not the building
was inhabited if a not too remote death occurred in the blaze. 36 Since the
homicide was in fact "caused" by the arson, the law could imply that the
arsonist had intended the natural and probable consequences of his felony, and
had thus "premeditated and deliberated" the homicide. The same reasoning
could be applied to any dangerous felony. Should causation so characterize
first degree murder, the mental state of that offense would become indistin-
guishable from malice aforethought, thus merging degrees of murder.37
The mental state of first degree murder could be preserved and first degree
convictions still secured even absent the felony murder doctrine by recogniz-
ing that the specific design to kill may be ancillary to the purpose which the
homicide serves. The typical first degree murder is characterized by a mental
state in which design to kill is at one with the primary purpose of the crime.
In contrast, the arsonist, robber or burglar may form a design to kill which is
ancillary to the commission of a felony, his primary purpose. Yet despite this
ancillary-primary dichotomy, the design to kill in order to accomplish primary
purpose is common to both.38 Thus, like the arsonist of an inhabited building,
the armed robber who will shoot to kill in order to perfect his robbery has
36. Based essentially on a causation theory, this was the result recently in Common-
wealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955). Although reversing on other grounds,
the court declared a first degree murder conviction proper where an accomplice's death
was caused by his own neglect in setting fire to an empty house. See Commonwealth v.
Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 98 A.2d 733 (1953), upholding first degree murder conviction where
defendant's only participation was driving the get-away car.
37. If the punishments were also unified, degrees of murder would of course no longer
enist. Felony killings would then be governed by the constructive malice doctrine and the
principle of culpability based on mental state met. It is not capital punishment of felony
killings which violates culpability but equating crimes characterized by design to kill as
well as malice aforethought with those involving malice aforethought alone for purposes
of imposing such punishment.
38. Design to kill in ancillary purpose established, the suggested analysis would not
differentiate between the primary purpose to accomplish a felony and that to commit a
misdemeanor. This differs from the present view. Killings committed in the course of
misdemeanors today produce only manslaughter convictions in many American jurisdic-
tions. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 93(a) (1934) ; MORELAND 240-45.
But design to kill in ancillary purpose should not justify first degree murder convic-
tion unless the primary purpose is unlawful. Building a skyscraper, for example, invari-
ably costs human life. The entrepeneur who undertakes this lawful primary purpose could
conceivably be thought to have formed a design to kill in ancillary purpose. Yet his
primary purpose so contributes to the public good as to negate any crinadl liability for
the deaths which in fact result. Legislation imposing criminal liability in such cases would
seek to remake the world as well as the law which presently regards such inevitable loss
of life justifiable. See Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37
CoLumt. L. REv. 701, 746 (1937).
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formed a design to kill in ancillary purpose. An unarmed robber fleeing from
a resisting victim, however, does not entertain such design; nor does the
arsonist who sets fire to a building with no cause to believe it is inhabited. When
the homicide is the act of defendant's accomplice, proof of defendant's design
to kill should remain essential to first degree conviction. This requirement
necessitates inquiry into the common plan in order to avoid first degree con-
viction where design to kill is personal to the accomplice and not shared by
defendant. 39 Under this approach, design to kill is essential to all first degree
convictions, malice aforethought to second degree offenses: the principle of
culpability is thus retained as the measure of punishment for criminal homicide.
39. A concept similar to felony murder might, however, still be retained in the form
of the vicarious criminal liability of conspiracy law. Under the rule of Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), a conspirator may be convicted for a substantive
offense committed by his co-conspirator in furtherance of the illegal agreement. If the
doctrine is applicable, a first degree murder by one conspirator in furtherance of the con-
spiracy could be attributed to his co-conspirators. In an agreement to commit a dangerous
crime, the requirement in Pinkerton that the criminal act, in this case death, be foresee-
able would be met. For a criticism of the Pinkerton rationale, see Note, 56 YALE L.J.
371 (1947).
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